This web site was established to facilitate the sharing of health, safety and environmental (HSE) related lessons learnt in the energy industry. The Energy Chamber hopes that by sharing of such valuable information accidents and incidents can be reduced or totally avoided in the future.

Location: Offshore
Date of event: 2/12/2018
Type of Event: Near miss

Description of event: Immediately after helicopter operations at an offshore platform, the windscreen of the crane cabin was observed on the walkway. It was broken into two pieces, one piece being relatively smaller compared to the other.

Description of consequences: Equipment Damage - dropped crane glass
Near Miss - Potential Injury to personnel

Immediate causes:

• The cabin windscreen glass weighing 55 lbs became loose and fell approximately 20ft from the crane to the walkway below.

Root causes:

• Differential Pulsation Force caused by helicopter downdraft coupled with high seasonal winds - on the day of the incident, the significant force generated by the combination of the helicopter down draft and high seasonal winds generated differential pulsation forces within the crane cabin. This force exceeded the rubber seal capacity to hold the windscreen in place, causing it to dislodge.
• Cabin door kept open during crane operation - The crane has two sliding windows on either side of the Operator. The right side is kept closed during crane operation due to the noise and heat generated by the crane’s engine. This significantly reduces air flow in and out of the cabin and as such the cabin door is normally kept open to provide ventilation inside the cabin.
• The sliding window was not replaced in a timely manner. The left sliding window glass broke in January 2016 and was removed in December 2016, for safety reasons, by the crane operator.

Corrective and preventative actions:

1 Crane windscreen on manned platforms should be retrofitted with aluminum framing together with rubber seals.
2 The Helicopter Landing Officer (HLO) checklist should be modified to include the following steps:
• Ensure crane cabin door and windows are properly closed.
• Temporary seal(s) are in place and effective.
3. Damaged sliding door glass should be replaced and resealed

Lessons learned:

1. Ensure damaged crane components (although they appear low risk) are replaced in a timely manner.
2. Consider use of aluminum perimeter framing with rubber sealant for crane windscreen.  


Location: Offshore
Date of event: 8/26/2018
Type of Event: Personal accident

Description of event: While conducting work on a condensate transfer pump the injured party (IP) suffered a laceration to the left thumb finger while removing bolts on spool between strainer and pump. A striking end spanner was in use and the maul hammer came into contact with a scaffolding pipe (Support Piping) which then ricochet onto his left thumb.

Description of consequences: First aid injury to worker

Immediate causes:
• IP's hand was positioned at base of striking end as he was holding the striking end spanner.
• Hammer used to impact striking end (to break bolts) inadvertently contacted adjacent scaffold pipe and ricocheted towards IP's hand on the striking end.
• No finger-saving device was provided by the team or contractor for this activity.

Root causes:
• Task step did not specifically identify breaking of bolts on the 10" spools and the method to be used.
• Scaffold design left accessibility issues for the rigging team due to the lack of integration among the various teams involved (Operations, Scaffolding, Rigging).
• IP was unaware of a finger saving device and was unaware of the company's procedure on the use of finger saving devices for this activity.
• Finger saving devices were not available for the activity.

Corrective and preventative actions:
1. Permits issued for bolt torqueing / de-torqueing activity to incorporate hazard of impacting fingers and include control measure of use of finger saving device.

Lessons learned:
1. Ensure activities (although considered low risk) are adequately risk assessed and the appropriate PPE used.
2. For bolt-torqueing activities, employ the use of finger saving type devices .



Location: Offshore
Date of event: 12/12/2017
Type of Event: Near miss

Description of event: While in the process of decanting / bunkering chemicals, from a portable Tote Tank to the facility’s Storage Tank, located one deck level below on an offshore platform, the tank walls (manufactured from stainless steel) collapsed. The incident was discovered when the Technician returned from his walkaround duties

Description of consequences: Damage to chemical tank - walls collapsed.

Immediate causes:
1. The vacuum breaker cap, atop the Tote tank was not removed sufficiently, to break the vacuum.
2. The task was being carried out, by one person, who was traversing between two levels.
3. There were no approved company procedures for this task. The Contractor’s procedures were being used.

Root causes:
1. There was no approved company procedure for the activity. Contractor’s procedure was used which did not provide the level of details for the activity, e.g. removal of the vacuum breaker cap.
2. The performance of this task was not adequately resourced. Two persons should have been assigned to safely perform the activity.

Corrective and preventative actions:
• Develop and implement an approved procedure for chemical bunkering.

Lessons learned:
• Ensure that approved company procedures are in place for chemical bunkering activities.
• Ensure that contactor procedures for activities are reviewed and approved for use.
• Ensure that tasks are sufficiently resourced for safe performance.


Location: Offshore
Date of event: 2/1/2018
Type of Event: Environmental accident

Description of event: During routine chemical bunkering from a portable chemical tote tank on the workover deck to the platform’s storage tank located on the production deck, the storage tank was overfilled. The chemical spilled from the storage tank via the flame arrestor. Although a toolbox conversation was held which identified the correct tank to be filled, the field team made an error by filling the wrong tank.

Description of consequences: Chemical overspill to secondary containment. No fluids entered the environment.

Immediate causes:
• Activity considered routine and did not take place under a permit.
• Verification was not confirmed between Field Technician and Control Room Operator on exact time tank was to be filled.
• The Bunkering fill lines and bunkering tanks were not properly labelled.
• There was no approved Standard Operating Procedure for the chemical bunkering activity. A generic document was being used.
• Field Technician left the site before the task was completed.

Root causes:
• Activity considered routine and did not take place under a permit or a risk assessed procedure.
• Inadequate labelling and reference to Chemical tanks in the field.
• Label on Human Machine Interaction (HMI) screen did not match field tank lables

Corrective and preventative actions:
1. Develop and implement an approved procedure for Chemical Bunkering.
2. Install field lables on tanks and piping.
3. Update HMI screen with tank field identification.

Lessons learned:
1. Ensure activities (although considered routine) are appropriately risk assessed and covered by a permit and/or standard operating procedure.
2. Ensure that piping and vessels are appropriately labelled in the field and match the control room HMI console where applicable.